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Claims of Indigenous Peoples to Cultural
Property in Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand
By THERESA SIMPSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cultural property is the subject of increasing international legal
interest. Numerous nations have enacted domestic legislation to pro-
tect their own cultural property, and several multilateral treaties and
bilateral agreements attempt to regulate its export and import.1 There
is also a growing call for repatriation of significant cultural objects, by
source nations and also by ethnic, religious, and other groups 2 The
ability to possess or control significant items of cultural property can
be especially important for indigenous3 groups attempting to retain
and cultivate their own cultural heritage. Disparities between indige-
nous groups' traditional norms concerning rights to possess and con-
trol cultural property and the common law property rules imposed by
many nations may hinder such groups' attempts to retain or repatriate
their cultural heritage. Restricting participation in international con-
ventions and tribunals to recognized nation-states also hinders indige-
nous groups attempting to assert cultural property rights.
* Member of the Class of 1995. B-A. University of California, Berkeley, 1933.
1. See 3 LYNDEL V. PRorr & P.J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGF,
MovaEmN" (1989) for an exhaustive discussion of international treaties and national laws
regulating trade in cultural artifacts.
2. See Catherine Bell, Aboriginal Claims to Cultural Property in Canada: A Compar-
ative Legal Analysis of the Repatriation Debate, 17 Am. INrDAN L REv. 457 (1992); Steven
Platzman, Comment, Objects of Controversy: The Native American Right to Repatriation,
41 Am. U. L. REv. 517 (1992); Peter H. Welsh, Repatriation and Cultural Preservation:
Potent Objects, Potent Pasts, 25 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 837 (1992).
3. While there is no universally accepted meaning for the term "indigenous," a useful
definition is those colonized groups "who have lost their sovereignty while maintaining a
distinct cultural identity," usually maintaining that identity "in intimate relation with their
traditionally-occupied territories." Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of
International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in
the World, 1990 DuKE Li. 660, 663 n.4.
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This Note will discuss existing national legislation protecting the
cultural property, especially movable property, of indigenous groups
in three common-law nations: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
The Note will examine statutes protecting cultural property as a re-
source for each nation as a whole, and statutes directed at protecting
the specific ownership rights of indigenous groups. In conclusion, this
Note will argue for recognition of the special value of cultural prop-
erty for these groups, and for the acceptance of communal ownership
of cultural property. It will emphasize the cultural over the property
value of the objects, and discuss the human rights argument for special
ownership rights in source cultures.
At present, only recognized nation-states may join in interna-
tional agreements and enforce claims before international tribunals.
This Note will argue for the right of indigenous groups to indepen-
dently enforce their cultural property rights under international agree-
ments, so that they will have a more effective voice in preserving their
own cultural patrimony.
H. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CULTURAL AND
NON-CULTURAL PROPERTY
The common-law definition of property is "[tjhat which is pecu-
liar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to
one .... The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a
thing."4 While this definition of property may suffice in purely mate-
rial terms, it fails to acknowledge the non-economic value of some
types of property, and the symbolic role certain objects can play in
cultural cohesiveness and vitality. Although traditional common-law
principles favor certainty of title and the free exploitation and aliena-
tion of property,5 there is increasing acceptance of restraints on these
customary ownership rights in relation to cultural property.6
4. BLAcK's LAW DICnONARY 635 (5th ed. abr. 1983).
5. The common law assumes that all property is capable of being owned by an indi-
vidual, and assumes that the interests of both individual owners and the community are
best served by a "free market" in which all property is able to be traded. Courts have
therefore stressed the importance of certainty of title. Bell, supra note 2, at 460. See also
Lyndel V. Prott and Patrick J. O'Keefe, 'Cultural Heritage' or 'Cultural Property', 1 INT'L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 307 (1992).
6. Alan Marchisotto, Note, The Protection of Art in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1974).
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Broadly defined, cultural property includes objects of archeologi-
cal, historical, artistic and ethnological importance. 7 It is property
which functions as "a repository of cultural and traditional informa-
tion,"s which has value beyond any intended functional use and be-
yond its monetary value in the international marketplace. Cultural
property is "considered essential to the self-understanding" of the
group which created it.9 Such objects help a culture define itself and
remember and understand the past. They can provide a record on
which future generations may build and can encourage continued cul-
tural vigor. Cultural property "uniquely represents the identity of a
culture in terms of a people's concept of themselves,... [the visible
and conceptual worlds] and their relationships."'"
Many types of movable cultural property are avidly collected in
the international art market as objects of beauty, objects of scholarly
interest, and as valuable investments. In recent years, artifacts from
indigenous cultures have been increasingly in demand for investment
purposes by collectors and dealers in industrialized countries." This
demand for "tribal art" has led to an escalated loss of the movable
cultural heritage of many indigenous groups. At the same time, these
groups are often making efforts to preserve and protect the cultural
traditions embodied by these artifacts. Items of cultural property can
be especially important to those groups who transmit cultural tradi-
tions and knowledge orally and symbolically, rather than through
written words, and who thus use cultural artifacts as "visual aids to the
spoken word."'' 2 Indigenous groups' traditional norms regarding the
right to possess and use such objects, however, do not always satisfy
the common-law requirements of "ownership."' 3 This poses difficul-
ties for those groups trying to demonstrate the right to own or control
cultural property in terms cognizable in the dominant legal system.
7. See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 17, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 234 [hereinafter
UNESCO Convention].
8. Robin A. Morris, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Trade in Cultural Property, 1990
N.Z. LJ. 40,42 n.1.
9. Rebecca Clements, Misconceptions of Culture: Native Peoples and Cultural Prop-
erty Under Canadian Law, 49 U. ToRoNTo FAc. L REv. 1, 2 (1991).
10. Id. at 40.
11. Id. See also Primtive Pathway to Pots of Money-Tribal Art, N-DE amENDIr, June
21, 1992, at 20.
12. Clements, supra note 9, at 40.
13. PRo-rr & O'KEE_ supra note 1, at 877.
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The assertion of special rights to cultural objects by nations and
culture groups has led to much debate concerning the extent to which
these rights should be recognized. This debate has centered around
two poles which have been labeled "cultural nationalism" and "cul-
tural internationalism."14 Cultural nationalists support the retention
and repatriation of cultural objects to the nation or culture group of
origin and view ownership or control of such objects primarily as a
human rights issue. Cultural internationalists see culitural objects as
part of the common heritage of mankind and argue that the interna-
tional art trade helps to preserve objects which might otherwise not be
protected.
m. PROTECTION FOR CULTURAL PROPERTY
A. History of Regulation
There is a long history of legislation recognizing the special status
of cultural property. As early as 1462, Papal edicts attempted to con-
trol the excavation of relics in Rome and the Papal States.15 In the
17th century similar edicts imposed export controls on, and intro-
duced state pre-emption of ownership of, cultural property. 16 Begin-
ning in the mid-1800s and accelerating after World War II, numerous
nations adopted legislation regulating export, excavation, and owner-
ship of artwork, antiquities, and cultural property. 17 In recent years,
many nations have also passed national ownership laws, which to va-
rying degrees vest ownership of cultural objects in the state.18 In
United States v. McClain,"9 a United States Federal Court of Appeals
14. See John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. 3.
INT'L L. 831 (1986); Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the "Cultural" and
"Property" Aspects of Cultural Property Under International Law, 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
1003 (1993).
15. PR'oTr & O'KF_'E, supra note 1, at 453.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 454.
18. See THE PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY, COMPENDIUM oF LEO.
isrLATrvn TEXTS I, at 30-42 (United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion ed., 1984) for a discussion of systems of ownership and use. Nations which vest
ownership of cultural property to a greater or lesser extent in the state include Algeria,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Venezuela, Turkey, and Malaysia.
19. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. McClain,
593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) (there were two stages to this case). Afthough the district
court had recognized Mexican state ownership of pre-Columbian artifacts beginning in
1897, the appellate court held that Mexican law did not unequivocally establish state own-
ership until the enactment of the 1972 Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and His-
toric Monuments and Zones, 312 D.O. 16 (1972).
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recognized the Mexican government's assertion of state ownership of
artifacts which had been illicitly smuggled into the United States. The
objects were deemed "stolen goods" under the United States National
Stolen Property Act since they were imported into the United States
without the consent of the Mexican government. 0
B. International Agreements
There are several international agreements which recognize the
special status of cultural property. The 1954 Convention for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict ("Hague
Convention")21 is the earliest such agreement which explicitly focuses
on protection of cultural property.2 The Hague Convention covers
both movable and immovable property which is "of great importance
to the cultural heritage of every people."23 Cultural property is thus
protected as a resource of value to the world as a whole, rather than
for its worth to any particular group. Parties to the Hague Conven-
tion are barred from military use of, or attacks against, cultural monu-
ments and surrounding areas, although this protection may be lost
under conditions of imperative military necessity.2a The Hague Con-
vention calls for individual responsibility for offenses against cultural
property. Parties to the convention must prevent theft, pillage, and
vandalism against cultural property, and may not export such property
from occupied areas. 5
In accordance with the Hague Convention, current international
legal norms support restitution of cultural property lost due to armed
conflict, but do not treat objects lost due to economic or colonial con-
quest in the same fashion? 6
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
("UNESCO Convention") regulates both export and import of cul-
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2314-15 (1988 & Supp. Hl 1990).
21. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
ffict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. Although 76 na-
tions were parties to this convention as of January 1, 1992, the United States, Canada and
New Zealand are not among them. Australia joined September 19, 19S4.
22. Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 5, at 312.
23. Hague Convention, supra note 21, art. 1.
24. Id. art. 11.
25. IL art. 4.
26. Mastalir, supra note 14, at 1049. See also C. Franklin Sayre, Comment, Cultural
Property Laws in India and Japan, 33 UCLA L Rnv. 851 (1986).
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tural property by party nations 2 7 The UNESCO Convention is the
major international agreement regulating traffic in such property. In
contrast to the Hague Convention's focus on the importance of cul-
tural property to the common world heritage, the UNESCO Conven-
tion seeks to prevent the impoverishment of individual nations'
cultural heritage due to illicit export of cultural property.28 The par-
ties agree that any trade in cultural objects contrary to the law of the
source nation is illicit, and agree to prevent the import of such illicitly
exported objects and to facilitate their repatriation.29 Member na-
tions have discretion to designate which specific types of objects will
be protected under the categories of cultural property designated by
the UNESCO Convention.3 0
Cultural groups as such do not have authority under the
UNESCO Convention to designate objects of cultural significance to
be protected-that power. lies exclusively with those nation-states
which are eligible to become parties to the Convention. Although the
cultural significance of cultural artifacts is recognized by the Conven-
tion, that significance is only acknowledged in relation to states, rather
than culture groups.31 Of the major importing countries,3 2 only the
United States and Canada have joined the UNESCO Convention.
Free trade agreements, inflated prices paid for cultural objects in
wealthy import nations, and a lack of resources to enforce the Con-
vention and accompanying national legislation in source countries
have hampered implementation.3
Other international agreements relating to cultural property in-
clude the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World
27. UNESCO Convention, supra note 7.
28. Id. art. 2.
29. Id. arts. 7, 9, 13.
30. Id. art. 1. This Article states: "For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'cul-
tural property' means property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically desig-
nated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature,
art or science." The Convention lists eleven categories of cultural property, including art,
objects of ethnological interest, postage stamps, products of archaeological excavations,
and rare manuscripts.
31. Id. The preamble notes "that cultural property constitutes one of the basic ele-
ments of civilization and national culture." Article 4 acknowledges the importance of cul-
tural property for "the cultural heritage of each State." (emphasis added).
32. In addition to the United States and Canada major markets for cultural property
include Japan, Great Britain, France, and Germany.
33. For further discussion of the UNESCO Convention see Lyndel V. Prott, Interna-
tional Control of Illicit Movement of the Cultural Heritage: The 1970 UNESCO Convention
and Some Possible Alternatives, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 333 (1983); Merryman,
supra note 14.
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Cultural and Natural Heritage, 4 which is primarily intended to pro-
tect monuments and sites rather than movable objects. Another
UNESCO document, Recommendation on International Principles
Applicable to Archaeological Excavations,3 s and several regional con-
ventions adopted by the Council of Europe and the Organization of
American States36 are intended to regulate the excavation and export
of movable cultural property.
C. Repatriation
Repatriation of cultural objects is increasingly endorsed in the in-
ternational legal field. In 1978, UNESCO established an Intergovern-
mental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to
its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropria-
tion. 7 The term "return" was defined to apply to those "cases where
objects left their countries of origin prior to the crystallization of na-
tional and international law on the protection of cultural property.
Such transfers of ownership were often made from a colonized terri-
tory to the territory of the colonial power or from a territory under
foreign occupation."3 8 The Intergovernmental Committee has met
several times and produced guidelines for the framework and financ-
ing of return or repatriation of cultural objects,3 9 but there has been
little concrete implementation of this program to date.
Repatriation is usually discussed as a moral rather than legal is-
sue, and emphasizes the cultural over the property aspect of cultural
property.4° It is "concerned with the right treatment of diverse cul-
tures and objects significant to them."'4' Repatriation implicates more
generally accepted property rights as well. If repatriation is enforced,
34. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention for
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972,27 U.S.T. 37,
1037 U.N.T.S. 151.
35. Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Exca-
vations, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Sth Sess.
(1956), reprinted in UNrrr NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL OROANI.
zATION, UNESCO's STANDARD Szmr IN suNwm-s § IV.B2. (19&0 & Supp. H 1936).
36. The European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, May
6,1969, ET. T.S. No. 66; The European Convention on Cultural Property, June 23,1985,
25 LL.M. 44; The Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical and Ar-
tistic Heritage of the American Nations, June 16, 1976, 15 LL.M. 1350.
37. PRorr & O'KEEF supra note 1, at 834.
38. Id., quoting the Intergovernmental Committee's guidelines.
39. See id for a detailed discussion of the Intergovernmental Committee.
40. See Mastalir, supra note 14.
41. Id. at 1043.
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a current possessor may be denied continued ownership even if the
acquisition was in good faith. Other arguments utilized in the debate
over repatriation include the relative abilities of the source group and
current possessor to preserve and protect cultural objects, the benefits
of increased respect for other cultures due to appreciation of their
artistic achievements, and the stimulus to international artistic en-
deavors facilitated by access and exposure to diverse types of art.42
One of the most widely publicized attempts at repatriation in-
volves the so-called "Elgin" marbles, removed from the Parthenon by
Lord Elgin in 1801 and currently on display at the British Museum.
These marble carvings have been the subject of repeated, and so far
unsuccessful, demands for return to Greece.43 Repatriation efforts
have been successful in several instances, including the return of
mosaics illicitly removed from a Greek Orthodox Church located in
the Turkish part of Cyprus and ultimately imported into the United
States.44 The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit
found that the mosaics had been removed from the church in violation
of the Hague Convention and ordered them returned to the custody
of the Autocephalous Church.45
Another successful repatriation effort involved the return of pre-
Columbian textiles to the Coroma in Bolivia. The textiles had been
kept for many years as a community resource until they were stolen
and illegally imported into the United States.46 The importation vio-
lated the UNESCO Convention and forty-four textiles were returned
to the Coroma after threats of lawsuits and criminal prosecution.47
D. Indigenous Groups and Cultural Property
Australia and Canada are parties to the UNESCO Convention
and have passed enabling legislation.48 Although New Zealand is not
a party to that convention, it has enacted statutes similar to those
42. Id. at 1043-45. See also Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art,
34 STAN. L. Rv. 275, 294-310 (1982).
43. See John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. Rnv. 1881
(1985).
44. See Joseph A. Reaves, In a Divided Land, Ruling on Mosaics a Matter of Honor,
Cmc. TRm., Aug. 10, 1989, at 5.
45. Autocephalous Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th
Cir. 1990).
46. William H. Honan, U.S. Returns Stolen Ancient Textiles to Bolivia, N.Y. Tismis,
Sept. 27, 1992, at 23.
47. Id.
48. Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, 1986 Ausal. C. Acrs 11; Cultural
Property Export and Import Act (1975) (Can.).
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passed by nations party to the convention.4 9 While the statutes all
mention the cultural property of the respective indigenous groups of
each country, the artifacts covered by these statutes are to be pro-
tected as part of the cultural heritage of each country as a whole.
Thus, Australia controls the export and import of "objects relating to
members of the Aboriginal race of Australia and descendants of the
indigenous inhabitants of the Torres Strait Islands" 50 only if they are
of importance to Australia. Cultural property subject to export con-
trol in Canada includes "objects of ethnographic art or ethnography
relating to the aboriginal people of Canada of a value more than
$2,000."51 New Zealand regulates trade in artifacts which relate to the
history of the Maor. 2
In addition to the increasing recognition and protection of the
special relationship between source nations and their cultural prop-
erty, indigenous cultural groups have begun to demand and find sup-
port for their independent right to possess and control property
originating with their group. Although only nations with recognized
legal standing in international law are able to utilize treaties such as
the UNESCO Convention, indigenous groups can have equally impor-
tant interests in self-determination and cultural preservation. In addi-
tion to the right to govern themselves and their land, some assert that
"aboriginal fights" include "the right to determine their own cultural
priorities, identify what is and is not essential to their cultural integrity
and the survival of their heritage, and exercise ownership rights over
tribal cultural property."5 3 This has led to demands for the return of
items of cultural property held by museums and collectors, which may
have been acquired by grave-robbing, archeological digs, purchase
from individuals who did not necessarily have the right to sell, or out-
right theft.
When indigenous groups attempt to assert ownership rights in
their cultural property, they often have great difficulty satisfying the
common-law requirement of a prior possessory interest and demon-
strating a chain of title which would provide a legal basis to demand
return of the objects. Establishing property rights is made easier if
ownership is asserted on a collective or communal basis-forms of
49. Antiquities Act, 1975 N.Z. STAT. 337, No. 41.
50. Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act § 7(1)(b).
51. Bell, supra note 2, at 494.
52. Antiquities Act § 2.
53. Bell, supra note 2, at 457 (emphasis added).
54. Clements, supra note 9, at 7.
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ownership which are antithetic to many common law property poli-
cies.55 Collective and communal systems of property ownership do
not recognize ownership in any individual, but rather in the social
group as a whole. 6 In 1893 a United States court defined a communal
property system as one in which:
every member of the community is an owner... as such. He does
not take as heir, or purchaser, or grantee; if he dies his right of prop-
erty does not descend; if he removes from the community it expires;
if he wishes to dispose of it he has nothing which he can convey; and
yet he has a right of property . . . as perfect as that of any other
person; and his children after him will enjoy all that he enjoyed, not
as heirs but as communal owners 57
Although there is great diversity in the customary laws of indigenous
groups, the concept of communal ownership is common to many, and
may be used to justify strict inalienability and a right of repatriation of
cultural property.
The moral, legal, and scientific issues surrounding demands for
repatriation have been the subject of much debate. Frequent news
stories recounting demands for return of cultural proparty report ar-
guments propounded both by the groups demanding return and the
museums, universities, other institutions, and individuals attempting
to retain or obtain ownership of such property. For example, while
museums have asserted that retention of their collections is a form of
cultural preservation of "vanishing cultures," others claim that this ap-
proach ignores the continued existence of such cultures, diminishes
their vitality by removing tangible links between past and present, and
reduces the true value of the objects by removing them from their
cultural context.58
IV. AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION
A. Introduction
Aborigines have been in Australia for as long as 60,000 years.59
In 1992, there were about 300,000 Aborigines in Australia, comprising
55. Bell, supra note 2, at 461.
56. Id.
57. Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct. Cl. 281, 302 (1893).
58. See Peter H. Welsh, Repatriation and Cultural Preservation: Potent Objects, Potent
Pasts, 25 U. McH. J.L. REF. 837 (1992).
59. Australian PM Pledges Better Aborigine Treatment, Reuter Libr. Rep., December
10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World File.
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1.8 percent of the total population.' This is a dramatic decrease from
the estimated 750,000 to 2,000,000 living there before the arrival of
Europeans in 1788.61 In pre-colonial times there were about 500 "tri-
bal" groups with different languages or dialects-seminomadic gather-
ing and hunting groups with well developed trade networks. There
was great loss, both in number and cultural vitality, of Aboriginal cul-
tural groups after colonization. Although both urban and rural Ab-
original groups are marginalized in the dominant Australian society,
rural groups have been more successful in retaining at least some ele-
ments of their traditional culture.
B. Federal Legislation
Australia took early measures to control the export of Aboriginal
artifacts. An ethnological committee was set up to study the issue in
1906,62 and Aboriginal cultural objects were subject to federal cus-
toms controls by 1913.1 Included among objects of cultural property
subject to export control were many types of Aboriginal artifacts, in-
cluding "archeological and anthropological material relating to
Aboriginals ... who were in Australia before 1906."
Australia is a party to both the Hague Convention and the
UNESCO Convention. Australia's enabling legislation for the
UNESCO Convention is the 1986 Protection of Movable Cultural
Heritage Act.' Under this Act, the customs regulations which con-
trolled cultural property were replaced by a National Heritage Con-
trol List ("Control List") of objects subject to export control. The
Control List includes objects of ethnological, archeological, historical,
literary, artistic, scientific, or technological importance, including ob-
jects relating to Aborigines or Torres Strait Islanders.6 Listed Ab-
original objects include bark and long coffins, human remains, rock
art, dendroglyphs, and other sacred and secret ritual objects.67
Significantly, when Aboriginal groups were consulted regarding
export controls for Aboriginal items before the Protection of Movable
Cultural Heritage Act was drafted, they expressed concern about the
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. PRorr & O'EEFF, supra note 1, at 458.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, 1986 AusT. C. AcTs 11.
66. Id. § 7.
67. Graeme Neate, Power, Policy, Politics and Persuasion-Protecting Aboriginal Her-
itage Under Federal Laws, 6 ENvT. & PLAN. LJ. 214,243 (1989).
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movement of relics within Australia as well as internationally. The
Aborigines considered "an artifact in the hands of a dealer in Sydney
as lost to them as though it was in a collection in the United
Kingdom."6
In 1984 the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Act
was passed in response to these concerns. 69 Although intended only
as a temporary measure until more comprehensive legislation could
be enacted, the Act has become permanent. 70 This Act gives reserve
powers to the Commonwealth where a state or territory has not acted
to protect Aboriginal areas, places, and objects. 71 The government
may, upon application by an Aboriginal group, declare an area of land
or an object protected if the area or object is found to be significant to
Aboriginal tradition and under threat of injury or desecration.72
Of fifty-seven applications submitted under the Act as of 1988,
four had been granted.73 For example, a government declaration pre-
vented the sale of some significant Aboriginal objects by auction in
1985. Eventually, an Aboriginal organization negotiated with the auc-
tioneer and purchased the objects for safe-keeping by the Aboriginal
community.
7 4
There continues to be concern among Aborigines regarding the
"institutionalisation, fragmentation and alienation of our cultural heri-
tage." 75 Aboriginal communities are demanding information regard-
ing the extent of museum holdings of their cultural property, a role in
management of those properties, and legislation to facilitate return of
cultural materials to their group of origin. 6 A thriving market in con-
temporary Aboriginal art, with retail sales in 1988 of $18.5 million,77
68. PRorr AND O'KEEFE, supra note 1, at 66.
69. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984 Ausm. C.
AcTs 78.
70. Ben Boer, Cultural and Natural Heritage; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Heritage (Interim Protection) Amendment Act 1986, 4 ENvr.. & PLAN. LU. 66 (1987).
71. Id. at 67.
72. Neate, supra note 67, at 223-24.
73. Neate, supra note 67, at app. A.
74. Boer, supra note 70, at 67.
75. Henrietta Fourmile, The Need for an Independent National Inqviry into State Col-
lections of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage, 2 ABCRMOINAL L. BOLL.
3 (1992).
76. Id. at 4.
77. This amount is Australian dollars. Colin Golvan, AboriginalArt and the Protection
of Indigenous Cultural Rights, 2 AnmoiiNAL L. Bum. 5 (1992).
[Vol. 18:195
Cultural Property in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
has caused Aborigines to express concern regarding usurpation of
their artwork by non-Aborigines for commercial purposes. 8
Even though a sale or transfer of sacred or artistic Aboriginal
objects may comply with common law requirements for alienation of
property, it may nevertheless violate Aboriginal customary law.79 In a
1989 court action, Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia,0 an Ab-
original artist objected to a bank's reproduction of one of his works on
a commemorative ten dollar note, asserting that ownership of the de-
sign was a collective right of his group and was "managed on a custo-
dial basis under Aboriginal tradition."81 The artist maintained that he
did not have the authority for the permission he had allegedly given
for reproduction.82 Existing Australian copyright laws did not support
the plaintiff's action and he was unsuccessful. However, the court did
express concern that traditional Aboriginal rights regarding reproduc-
tion of art were not sufficiently protected by existing la,,, stimulating
debate over what might constitute appropriate protection for Aborigi-
nal art.83
At least some types of Aboriginal cultural property would appear
to have traditionally been subject to communal ownership. 4 Sugges-
tions for recognizing such traditional ownership systems have included
the incorporation of collective ownership rights, and the ability to pro-
tect communal interest in cultural heritage in general, into the Aborig-
inal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Act.,5 Copyright protection
for Aboriginal art, giving ownership to the community instead of the
individual artist, has also been proposed s 6
C. State Legislation
Most Australian states have legislation intended to protect Ab-
original artifacts. Victoria's Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics
78. Id.
79. DISCUSSION PAPER No. 18, ABORIGIAL CUSTOMARY Lmv-NIARRMGE, CHIL-
DREN AND THE DIsnuBuTioN OF PROPERTY 17 (Australian Law Reform Commission ed.,
1982).
80. 21 I.P.R. 481 (1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Auscas File.
81. Golvan, supra note 77, at 6-7.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 6.
84. See Nancy M. Villiams, Yolngu Concepts of Land Ownership, in ABORONs,
LAND AND LAND Riourrs 94 (Nicolas Peterson & Marcia Langton eds., 1933) for a discus-
sion of traditional aboriginal concepts of property rights.
85. Golvan, supra note 77, at 7-8.
86. DIScussioN PAPER, supra note 79, at 17-18.
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Preservation Act of 1972 is one example. 7 This Act provides for the
designation of "archeological areas in order to preserve relics" which
are not to be "defaced, damaged, excavated, [or] disturbed.""8 How-
ever, the Act also states that all such relics are the property of the
Crown. 9
Australian courts have held that Aboriginal groups have standing
to bring suit under this Act, even when they are no longer in posses-
sion of the land in question. 90 The courts have reasoned that the Ab-
original interest in using the land and artifacts scattered upon it to
educate their children in their traditional culture is sufficient interest
in the land to grant standing.91 In 1987 the national Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act was amended with re-
spect to Victoria only.92 The Amendment allows "declarations of
preservation" for Aboriginal places and objects, and also Aboriginal
Cultural Heritage Agreements between possessors of Aboriginal cul-
tural property and Aboriginal communities. The declarations of pres-
ervation and the Cultural Heritage Agreements both govern
disposition and protection of cultural property. 93
In Tasmania, the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1970 permits
the acquisition of land in order to further the "preservation or protec-
tion of any Aboriginal relics thereon." 94 In the Northern Territory,
the Native and Historical Objects and Areas Preserva tion Ordinance
of 1955 states that objects of ethnological or anthropological interest
relating to Aborigines shall not be concealed, destroyed, defaced,
damaged, or removed from the Territory without permission.95
D. Mabo and the Native Title Act
A recent Australian High Court decision involving Aboriginal
land rights may have implications for cultural property. Prior to 1992
87. Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act of 1972, § A628, reprinted
in JomN MCCORQuODALE, ABoiimrm-s AND Tm LAW: A DiosT 87 (1987).
88. Id. § 6.
89. Id.
90. PRorr & O'KEEFE, supra note 1, at 65-68 (discussing Onus v. Alcoa, 36 A.L.R.
425 (1981) (Austl.)).
91. Id.
92. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Amendment Act, 1987
AusT. C. ACrS 39.
93. Neate, supra note 67, at 241.
94. National Parks and Wildlife Act, § 13(e), No. 47 (1970) (Austl), reprinted in Mc.
CORQUoDALE, supra note 87, at 79.
95. Native and Historical Objects and Areas Preservation Ordinance, §§ 3, 6, No. 15
(1955) (Austl.), reprinted in MCCORQUODALE, supra note 87, at 35.
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Australian courts had held that any customary native land title was
extinguished to the Crown when Britain acquired Australia as a col-
ony.96 In Mabo v. Queensland,97 however, the Australian High Court
decided that Aboriginal title was not automatically extinguished,
although the Crown did have power to appropriate Aboriginal land to
itself or alienate such land to others if the intent to do so was clear.93
Aboriginal title, or "native title," is recognized as pre-dating the arri-
val of European colonists and as continuing to exist, even with "char-
acteristics unknown in the common law." 9  The High Court
recognized that native land title is usually communal and that it can-
not be alienated to outsiders.1'0 Native title, now recognized by com-
mon law, qualifies for protection under available common-law
remedies, even where title is communal or in a group.101
At least two commentators interpret Mabo as allowing protection
of Aboriginal communal interest in art on the same basis as Aborigi-
nal land interests are protected. 2 Mabo held that the "nature and
incidents" of native title were to be determined by reference to the
laws and customs of the Aboriginal group.0 3 As early as 1971 an Aus-
tralian case recognized that under Aboriginal belief "[t]here is an un-
questioned scheme of things in which the spirit ancestors, the people
of the clan, particular land and everything that exists on and in it, are
organic parts of one indissoluble whole."'0 The nature of Aboriginal
ownership of land is essentially religious05 and the importance of sa-
cred and other cultural objects "derives from their status as tangible
symbols of land ownership." 1 6 Under traditional Aboriginal belief,
"art and land are essentially interconnected" 7 as aspects of a whole;
art is a "nature or incident of Aboriginal native title in land from an
Aboriginal perspective."108 The Mabo decision may thus support con-
96. Peter Butt, Mabo v. Queensland.. A Summary, 67 Aus-m. L. 442 (1993).
97. Mabo v. Queensland, 66 A ,LR. 408 (Austl. 1992).
98. Butt, supra note 96, at 442.
99. Id. at 443.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 444.
102. Stephen Gray, Wheeling, Dealing and Deconstruction, Aboriginal Art and the
Land, 3 ABoRIGINAL I- BuL 10 (1993); Colin Golvan, Aboriginal Art and Mabo, 3 An.
omRGNAL L. But.. 12 (1993).
103. Gray, supra note 102, at 10.
104. Milirrpum v. Nabalco, 17 F.L.R. 141 (1971), quoted in Williams, supra note 84, at
95. '
105. Id.
106. Williams, supra note 84, at 107 n3.
107. Gray, supra note 102, at 11.
108. Id.
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tinuing Aboriginal communal title in at least some forms of cultural
property.
In December of 1993 Australia passed the Native Title Act 09 in
response to the Mabo decision. The Native Title Act provides a
mechanism for determining the existence of native title, for validating
any existing land rights, and for compensating Aboriginal groups
when their title has been extinguished.110 The Act also eliminates the
independent right of States and Territories to extinguish native title.111
There is no specific mention of property other than land in the legisla-
tion and thus, it remains to be seen what effect the new law will have
on ownership rights in movable cultural property.
V. CANADIAN LEGISLATION
A. Introduction
The exact number of Canadian Indians is unknown. In 1979
there were over 300,000 "registered" Indians (officially recognized by
the government as "Indians") in 573 recognized bands, about 25,000
Inuit, and between 260,000 and 850,000 "non-status" Indians (includ-
ing non-registered and Metis). 112 Unlike the United States, Canada
has never recognized the sovereign status of indigenous groups. How-
ever, there has been judicial recognition of indigenous land title if it
has not been otherwise extinguished. 13 This recognition is not in con-
formity across Canada, but is independently decided by each
province.1 14
B. National Legislation
Canada had no export control for cultural objecls of any kind
until it enacted the Cultural Property Export and Import Act of 1975
("Export and Import Act").1 5 This Act was passed before Canada
acceded to the.UNESCO Convention in 1978. The Act protects In-
109. Native Title Act, 1993 Ausm. C. Acts 110.
110. MABo AND THE NATIVE TrrLE Acr 1993, at 5-6 (1990) (booklet prepared by Aus-
tralian law firm of Blake, Dawson & Waldron) (on file with author).
111. Id. at 6.
112. Bradford W. Morse, Aboriginal Peoples and the Law, in ABORIGINAL PnorPLrs
AND THE LAW: INDIAN, MEns AND INurr RIoS IN CANADA 1, 5 (Bradford W. Morse
ed., 1991).
113. See David W. Elliott, Aboriginal Title, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLE.S AND THE LAW,
supra note 112, at 48.
114. Bell, supra note 2, at 482.
115. Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. chs. 46-54 (1975) (Can.) [herein-
after Export and Import Act].
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dian and Inuit objects as well as those pertaining to European immi-
grant cultures and establishes a control list of objects which may not
be exported without a permit issued by the government. Export per-
mits are denied if the object is of outstanding significance or national
importance. 116 Prior to the Export and Import Act, important na-
tional treasures, including "a significant portion of... [the] cultural
heritage... of the Native Peoples had gone to museums and private
collectors in continental Europe and Britain... almost unnoted.""1
7
Objects are listed under the Export and Import Act depending
upon whether they fit certain "characteristics," 1 8 rather than on any
overall cultural significance. 119 Export permits are issued unless the
objects are found to be of "outstanding significance" to the national
heritage. Thus, the criteria for issuing permits consider the impor-
tance of the object to Canadian national culture as a whole, rather
than to the source culture. 20 Although the Act provides government
grants and loans to Canadian institutions and public authorities to en-
able them to purchase objects which are in danger of export, assist-
ance is unavailable to those indigenous groups who wish to purchase
such objects.' 2 ' Source culture groups thus receive less support for
purchasing objects of their own cultural heritage than do museums.
Canada's 1970 Indian Act' confers title to the government in,
and places certain restrictions on, items of indigenous cultural prop-
erty discovered on historic sites and native reserves.123 For example,
written consent from the government is needed to transfer title to
grave houses, totem poles, carved house posts, pictographs, and petro-
glyphs which are found on native reserves. While the Indian Act does
protect indigenous cultural property to some extent, control is again
vested in the government rather than in the indigenous group.
116. Id, § 11(3).
117. D.F. Camerson, An Introduction to the Cultural Property Export and Import Act
(Dept. of the Sec. of State, Ottowa, 2d ed., 19S0), quoted in PRoTr AND O'KEmu1 supra
note 1, at 458.
118. R.S.C. ch. 50, § 4(2) (1985) (Can.). These characteristics include: objects of any
value which are of archaeological, historical, or scientific interest and were recovered from
the soil or waters of Canada; objects relating to aboriginal peoples of Canada and worth
more than $500; objects of decorative art made in Canada and more than 100 years old;
books, documents, photographs, and recordings worth more than S500; artwork worth
more than $1,000; and other objects worth more than $3,000. No object is included if it is
less than 50 years old or made by a person still living.
119. Clements, supra note 9, at 19.
120. Id. at 18.
121. Id.
122. Indian Act, R.S.C. chs. 1-6 (1970) (Can.).
123. Clements, supra note 9, at 18; Bell, supra note 2, at 491.
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A proposed Archaeological Heritage Protection Act was tabled
in 1990 in order to allow for consultation with indigenous groups.124
This legislation would give title to archaeological objects found on all
federal lands (other than reserves) to the "Queen in right of Can-
ada."'125 Presently, the common law determines property rights for
objects found on federal land.126 Pending passage of this legislation,
indigenous groups must assert ownership rights against the "land-
owner" government, which has a policy of claiming ownership of
archaeological resources discovered on federal land.127 Under the ex-
isting law, even the government's claim to ownership rights of objects
may be inferior to that of a non-indigenous "finder. ' 128
C. Provincial Legislation
Canada's various provinces also have legislation affecting indige-
nous cultural property rights. Alberta vests ownership of archaeologi-
cal resources found on both public and private lands in the Crown. 29
Buried and partially buried indigenous cultural artifacts are subject to
the Alberta legislation, weakening indigenous repatriation claims
against museums and other organizations. For instance, if an object
covered by the legislation was acquired by a museum fiom the Crown,
the museum's title would be legal and not subject to a demand for
repatriation.130 However, efforts toward repatriation of objects ac-
quired other than through the Crown might meet with more success,
since ownership rights would have been transferred in violation of the
legislation. 3 '
Since 1971 the Canadian government has funded a program to
assist museums in repatriating items of importance to the Canadian
cultural heritage. 32 The program has succeeded in repatriating many
items of indigenous cultural property, including a West German col-
lection of 259 items from the Great Lakes, Prairie, and Eastern Cana-
124. Marion Haunton, Legislation, Report 1: Canada's Proposed Archaeological Heri-
tage Protection Act, 2 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 395, 395 (1992).
125. Id.
126. Bell, supra note 2, at 492.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 483.
130. Id. at 484.
131. Id. at 483.
132. Barrie Reynolds, The Repatriation of Canadian Indian and Eskimo Collections, in
PRESERVING INDIGENOUS CULTURES: A NEW ROLE FOR MUSEUMS 161 (Robert Edwards
& Jenny Stewart eds., 1980).
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dian regions. 3 The repatriation was viewed in terms of its cultural
importance to the nation as a whole, rather than to the source cul-
tures. Indigenous groups were therefore not consulted and did not
obtain any rights of control over the repatriated objects.
D. Current Legal Status
As in other countries, Canadian indigenous groups have lost pos-
session of cultural objects through grave robbing, theft, and "unau-
thorized" sale. One infamous incident included the forced sale of
indigenous potlatch artifacts to museums, under government threat of
imprisonment of tribal elders.134 Existing legislation and current com-
mon law confer title to indigenous cultural objects which are not in
the possession of the source communities in either the Crown or the
current possessor. However, evolving definitions and formulations of
indigenous rights may support communal title in indigenous source
communities, even where possession has long been lost.1 -3 5
The current status of Canadian indigenous collective ownership
of cultural objects is uncertain. One case in which collective owner-
ship was an issue, Mohawk Bands v. Glenbow-Alberta Institute,- 6 did
not reach the trial stage. The Mohawk objected to exhibition of a
False Face Mask, a sacred object used in the spiritual practices of the
Mohawk Nation. A permanent injunction against display was denied
because the judge found that the display caused no irreparable harm
to the Mohawk culture. 37 One writer has asserted that "the use of
collective legal language by the courts, the growing awareness of the
ethnocentric interpretation of rights, the constitutional recognition of
aboriginal rights and the infusion of notions such as honor and duty
into aboriginal rights discourse" may lead Canadian courts to
"reformulate the rules of property to accommodate an aboriginal per-
spective" including recognition of communal rights in cultural
property." 8
Section 35 of the 1982 Canadian Constitution Act states that the
"[e]xisting aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
133. Id. at 163.
134. PRorr AN O'KEEF , supra note 1, at 433.
135. Bell, supra note 2, at 465-67.
136. Mohawk Bands v. Glenbow-Alberta Inst., 3 C.N.LR. 70 (19SS) (Alta.Q.B.).
137. Bell, supra note 2, at 464.
138. Id. at 464-65.
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Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. ' 139 In 1984 the Cana-
dian Supreme Court held these rights to be pre-existing, rather than
created or granted by either Royal Proclamation or government or-
der.140 In a 1990 case, Regina v. Sparrow,14 1 the Supreme Court de-
clared that aboriginal rights were affirmed by the Constitution "in
their unregulated form, subject only to prior extinguishment.' 142 The
Supreme Court, however, neither defined the limits of aboriginal
rights, nor froze them "at any particular point in history.' 43 Thus, the
content and scope of aboriginal rights may be flexibly defined, al-
lowing for current situations and uses. 4 Although Sparrow involved
fishing rights, the findings regarding aboriginal rights could be ex-
tended to ownership of cultural property.
In addition to the legal efforts to establish ownership rights in
cultural property, such as in Mohawk Bands, indigenous groups have
attempted to repatriate items of cultural importance through less for-
mal means. Having received government funding for a cultural inter-
pretive center, members of the Siksika Nation are attempting to
retrieve items held by the Smithsonian Institution and Canadian mu-
seums, through either long-term loan or purchase. 45 Although the
Siksika are not claiming a right to possession through "aboriginal
rights" in their cultural property, they are urging Canada to pass legis-
lation similar to the United States Native American Grave Protection
and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), 46 which requires museums to in-
form indigenous groups of their holdings and to work with such
groups in managing their collections.' 47
139. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. II (Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of
Canada), § 35(1).
140. Guerin v. The Queen, 2 S.C.R. 335 (1984) (Can.).
141. Regina v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R. 4th 385 (1990) (Can.).
142. Bell, supra note 2, at 505-06.
143. ma at 506.
144. Id. at 507.
145. Wendy Dudley, Siksika Councillor on a Hunt, CALGARY HEr:ALD, Jan. 19, 1993,
at B1.
146. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act § 7, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-
3013 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) [hereinafter NAGPRA].
147. Dudley, supra note 145, at B1.
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VL NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION
A. Introduction
The Maori migrated to modem day New Zealand from Polynesia
about 1,000 years ago.148 There were approximately forty Maori
tribes and numerous sub-tribes, each of which held land com-
munally.149 In 1994, 8.9 percent of the total New Zealand population
of 3,520,000 were Maori."5
The Maori's traditional law regarding land tenure allowed for
rights of occupation and use to be divided among subgroups and indi-
viduals while reserving the right of alienation to the group.151 The
Treaty of Waitangi 5 is the underlying basis for all relations between
the Maori as a group and the New Zealand government. This ex-
tremely brief document cedes all rights of sovereignty to the Queen'- 3
and guarantees to the Maori "the full, exclusive and undisturbed pos-
session of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and other proper-
ties which they may collectively or individually possess."' 4 While this
guarantee seems to include cultural property and to expressly recog-
nize collective ownership, the legal validity and enforceability of Ma-
ori title in land guaranteed by the Treaty was denied by a New
Zealand court in 1877." s The court held that the Maori had no "set-
tled system of law" at the time of European settlement and thus, could
not claim legal title to territory. 56 This viewpoint and the mistaken
belief that the source of the property rights was the Treaty and not
Maori law became incorporated into New Zealand legislation.'/ In
recent years the New Zealand government has been more willing to
recognize the validity of the Treaty provisions and to recognize certain
aboriginal rights of the Maori population.15s
148. ANDREw SHARP, JusncE AND m MAoRi-MAorI CtLms iN NEw ZEALAND
POLITICAL ARGUMNT IN =us 1980s at 3 (19S0).
149. Id. at 4-5.
150. Country: New Zealand, KVCD/Kaleidoscope, Sept. 16, 1994, available in LEXS,
World Library, Allwld file.
151. P.G. MCHUGH, Trm FRAG~mNTATION OF MAoRi LAND 5 (1980).
152. Treaty of Waitangi, Feb. 6, 1840, Eng.-Maori, 89 Consol. T.S. 473-75.
153. Id. art. L
154. Id. art. IL
155. Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington, 1877 N.Z.LtR 72.
156. Frederika Hackshaw, Nineteenth Century Notions of Aboriginal Title and Their In-
fluence on the Interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, in VArrANGi, MAORI AND PuKHA
PERSPECrIVES ON THE TREATY OF WArrANGI 92, 110-11 (LEL Kawharu ed., 19S9).
157. Id. at 117.
158. See Sharp, supra note 148.
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B. Legislation
Cultural property first left New Zealand with the explorer Cook
after his initial visit.'59 New Zealand restricted the export of Maori
antiquities as early as 1901.1' The 1962 New Zealand Historic Arti-
cles Act restricted export of historic articles but placed no restraints
on ownership rights exercised within New Zealand. 161 Under this Act,
a written certificate of permission was necessary before exporting
"historic articles," which were defined to include "any chattel, artifact,
carving, object, or thing which relates to the history, art, culture, or
economy of the Maori... and other native group.''1 2 Difficulty in
enforcing the Historic Articles Act led to passage of the Antiquities
Act in 1975.163 The Antiquities Act declares the Crown owner of any
Maori artifact "found anywhere in New Zealand... after the com-
mencement of this Act"'164 and restricts export of such articles unless
the exporter receives a written certificate of permission from the gov-
ernment. 65 Under the Antiquities Act, the Maori Land Court de-
cides issues of ownership.
In 1990 the government announced plans to introduce a Protec-
tion of Movable Cultural Properties Bill which would vest ownership
of newly discovered Maori artifacts with Maori authorities rather than
the Crown.' 66 The Bill would also allow for proper monitoring of ex-
ports of cultural property. 67
Both the New Zealand government and the Maori have at-
tempted to repatriate dispersed Maori cultural artifacts. A shop in
Hawaii which held two tattooed heads for sale refused to return them
to Maori possession despite New Zealand's offer to pay all ex-
penses. 68 In 1988 a tattooed head discovered in England was offered
for auction in London. The New Zealand Maori Council successfully
petitioned the New Zealand High Court for letters of administration
159. Keith W. Thomson, Retrieving Cultural Property: The Role of the New Zealand
Government, in PRESERVING INDIGENOUS CULTURES, supra note 132, at 168.
160. PROTr AND O'KEEFE, supra note 1, at 458.
161. Id. at 50.
162. Historic Articles Act, 1962 N.Z. Stat. 37.
163. Antiquities Act, 1975 N.Z. Stat. 337.
164. Id. § 11.
165. Id. § 5.
166. New Zealand. Cultural Boost Policy Pledge by Labour, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 25,
1990, at 2.
167. Id.
168. PRorr & O'KEEFE, supra note 1, at 886.
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as personal representatives of the estate 169 and sought an injunction
against the auctioneers in the High Court in London. An out-of-court
agreement was reached with the owners wherein the head was re-
turned to New Zealand to receive "a proper burial according to Maori
law and custom." 170
A notable case involving Maori cultural property was tried in
1982 in a London court. In Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Or-
tiz, 7 ' a Maori carved wooden door excavated and sold prior to 1975
by an individual Maori was found to be a "historical article" under
New Zealand laws and to have been illegally exported under the His-
toric Articles Act. The British court held that the carving had been
exported in violation of New Zealand law and thus, would be subject
to forfeiture to the government had the carving remained in New Zea-
land. However, the court held that the forfeiture was not effective at
the time the law was breached, but rather at the time the property was
actually seized by the New Zealand government. The Court held that
to find otherwise would "infringe the rule of international law which
says that no country can legislate so as to affect the rights of property
when that property is situated beyond the limits of its own terri-
tory." 72 Furthermore, the British court found the Antiquities Act to
be a public law of a foreign country and therefore, not enforceable in
a British court. 7 This case illustrates the difficulties faced even by
states with recognized international legal standing when they attempt
to enforce protection of their cultural property in the international
marketplace.
After passage of the Antiquities Act in 1975, ownership of the
carved Maori doors involved in Ortiz, as undiscovered artifacts, would
have automatically vested in the New Zealand government, which
would presumably have given the government better standing to re-
trieve the carving. Prior to the Antiquities Act, ownership would have
been an issue between the individual excavator and "the Tranaki tribe
whose ancestors had buried it."1 74 By Maori custom the "latter title
169. Estate of Tupuna Maor Warrior (.C. May 19, 198 (NZ)), discussed in PROTr
& O'KnEFE, supra note 1, at 886.
170. PRo-rT & O'KEEFE, supra note 1, at 886-87.
171. Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, 3 W.L.R. 570 (CA. 1982) (Eng.).
172. Id& at 580.
173. Monroe Leigh, Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, 77 Am. I INr,'eL L 631
(1983).
174. PRoTr & O'KEEra, supra note 1, at 614.
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would be communal" and would be litigated in the Maori Land
Court.175
The New Zealand government supports repatriation of Maori ar-
tifacts as one of the functions of the National Museumn of New Zea-
land. 76 However, this policy may do little to rectify the loss to local
Maori communities if repatriation of their cultural objects is limited to
inaccessible museum collections.
The price of Maori artifacts rose rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s,
not only tempting individual Maoris to sell tribal heirlooms, but also
leading to illegal excavation of sacred and other Maord sites. 177 Ex-
isting national legislation does little to protect the cultural heritage
rights of Maori as a group. Although New Zealand courts and legisla-
tion have been more willing in recent years to give credence to the
actual words of the Treaty of Waitangi, the import of the Treaty for
Maori communal rights in their cultural heritage has yet to be fully
examined.
VII. CONCLUSION
The argument for repatriation of indigenous cultural property
from both public and private non-indigenous possessors is that these
objects are "essential for the rebuilding, maintenance, and/or develop-
ment of a living culture."'178 It may be difficult, if not impossible, for
indigenous groups to meet the common-law prerequisites necessary
for successful assertion of the right to possess or control such objects.
However, the recognition of customary indigenous norms regarding
property rights, the recognition of special property rights in regard to
cultural property for all cultural groups, and an attempt to equitably
address past wrongs should assist repatriation efforts. Acknowledg-
ment of the preeminence of cultural issues over property issues in dis-
putes involving cultural property would assist the recognition of such
customary indigenous rights. Too often the argumen't for indigenous
rights becomes bogged down in the property rights analysis tradition-
ally utilized in the common law, which may not recognize the impor-
tant non-economic issues involved in disputes over cultural property.
Recent United States domestic legislation acknowledges repatria-
tion as a legitimate goal. NAGPRA compels repatriation of human
175. Id.
176. Id at 836.
177. Thomson, supra note 159, at 170.
178. Clements, supra note 9, at 24.
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remains, associated funerary objects, and objects of cultural patri-
mony held by federal agencies and museums receiving federal
funds.17 9 Objects of cultural patrimony are defined as those objects
which have ongoing importance to a Native American group and were
considered inalienable by the group at the time the object and group
were separated. s0 There is no obligation to compensate the agencies
and museums if they are required to repatriate objects from their col-
lections. Cultural items discovered on federal or tribal land after the
enactment of NAGPRA are owned by the tribal group or by their
lineal descendants. 81 The arguments used to support passage of
NAGPRA emphasized the human rights issues involved and advo-
cated strict inalienability of cultural patrimony, alleging that the free
market does not adequately protect such property.'2
NAGPRA is an example of emerging acceptance of indigenous
groups' discrete rights in cultural property. This legislation explicitly
recognizes the importance of ownership and control of certain types
of property to the source cultures. Although there is no effect on arti-
facts found on private land or currently in private hands, NAGPRA
recognizes the interest of indigenous groups in their own cultural
property as distinct from that of the nation in which they are
subsumed.
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all have indigenous popula-
tions and have legal systems originating in English common law. All
three countries currently have legislation which recognizes the impor-
tance of cultural property for the nation as a whole by imposing own-
ership restrictions and export controls. The Mabo decision in
Australia, the constitutional and legal recognition of aboriginal rights
in Canada, and renewed adherence to the Treaty of Waitangi guaran-
tee of traditional Maori rights in New Zealand demonstrate at least a
limited willingness to recognize the rights of indigenous populations.
Legislation similar to the United States NAGPRA statute would be
another important step in that recognition.
Given the extensive illicit trade in cultural property, domestic leg-
islation would most likely prove insufficient to protect the cultural
property rights of any group. Because there is a large and growing
foreign market for all types of cultural artifacts, the ability of any in-
digenous group to access the protection of international agreements is
179. NAGPRA § 7, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013.
180. I1& § 2(3)(D).
181. I. § 3.
182. Mastalir, supra note 14, at 1063.
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especially important. Although the United Nations supports the
rights of "[a]ll peoples.., to self-determination: by virtue of [which]
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development,' 8 3 cultural or ethnic
groups without "state" status are generally neither allowed to partici-
pate in United Nations deliberations nor become parties to, or enforce
rights on their own behalf under, international conventions.'84 The
recognized nation-state in which an indigenous group lives may be un-
able or unwilling to sufficiently protect the group's interests under in-
ternational conventions.
There is much debate over the proper and just role of cultural
groups in the international legal arena. 85 Permitting indigenous cul-
tural groups to independently participate in international agreements
concerning cultural property need not implicate all of the convoluted
issues which would be raised by such participation in other areas of
international law. The very nature of the interest in cultural property
lies in its cultural, rather than political, importance. Regardless of the
outcome of the current debate over self-determination for indigenous
groups, the ability to control trade in a group's cultural patrimony
should be less controversial than full scale political participation.
Recent years have seen increasing acceptance of the rights of in-
digenous groups to participate in the international realm.18 6 Although
this recognition does not reach full self-determination, it helps "en-
sure the protection of indigenous peoples' collective existence and dis-
tinct institutions."'" The ability to safeguard their own cultural
heritage utilizing international laws and fora would be an important
aspect of this new recognition.
A special tribunal for handling international disputes involving
cultural property has been suggested.'8 Ensuring access to such a tri-
bunal for indigenous and other cultural groups would riot only assist
these groups in asserting their rights, but would also explicitly demon-
183. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
184. See Russel L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of
International Law?, 7 HARv. HUM. Rrs. J. 33 (1994).
185. See Maivan Clech Lam, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts
Provoked by Indigenous Clairhs to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 603 (1992);
Barsh, supra note 184.
186. See Barsh, supra note 184.
187. Id. at 43.
188. Mastalir, supra note 14, at 1067.
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strate a commitment to honoring the cultural as well as the property
value of cultural objects.

